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449 
EFFECTIVE TAXATION OF CARRIED INTEREST: 
A COMPREHENSIVE PASS-THROUGH 
APPROACH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Taxation of ―carried interest‖ has been the subject of much recent 
scholarship.
1
 Articles have discussed the unfairness of taxing carried 
interest differently than other compensation for services,
2
 and addressed 
the dangers inherent in subjecting an intrinsically mobile tax base to rates 
higher than those presently applied to carried interest by the Internal 
Revenue Code.
3
 Most of this scholarship, however, erroneously ignores 
that fund managers who receive carried interest income are often in a 
position to significantly impact the U.S. economy.
4
 Ignoring this fact 
thereby forecloses an opportunity for Congress to utilize an efficient 
carried interest taxation regime as an instrument to promote its general 
economic goals, by means of rate differentials associated with policy 
objectives.
5
  
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Howard E. Abrams, The Carried Interest Catastrophe, 129 TAX NOTES 523 (2010); 
Darryll K. Jones, Sophistry, Situational Ethics, and the Taxation of the Carried Interest, 29 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 675 (2009); Philip F. Postlewaite, The Taxation of Compensatory Profits Interests: 
The Blind Men and the Elephant, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 763 (2009); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Not 
All Carried Interests are Created Equal, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 713 (2009). 
 2. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 1; Rosenzweig, supra note 1. 
 3. See, e.g., Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 746–55. Some of the various proposed changes to 
taxation of carried interest include recharacterizing such income as ordinary income at the partnership 
level, see Jones, supra note 1; imposing a mandatory short-term holding period on carried interest 
capital gains, thereby converting any such gains into short-term capital gains taxed at ordinary income 
rates, see Rosenzweig, supra note 1; or maintaining the status quo, see Postlewaite, supra note 1. 
Notwithstanding the fact that a minority of academics disagree, the general academic consensus 
appears to be that carried interest income should be ineligible for preferential long-term capital gains 
rates. See Postlewaite, supra note 1, at 765 nn.6–7. 
 4. Most carried interest income subject to long-term capital gains tax rates is earned by private 
equity fund managers. Hedge fund managers generally do not earn carried interest income eligible for 
long-term capital gains rates because hedge funds often hold their individual investments for periods 
not greater than one year. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 5. Colloquially, this may be referred to as a ―sticks and carrots approach.‖ However, because 
the only appropriate ―stick‖ should be taxation as ordinary income, the use of any ―carrot‖ in the form 
of lower effective tax rates should actually be considered a form of ―tax bribery‖—or the use of the 
Internal Revenue Code to encourage certain conduct and promote particular outcomes. Key examples 
of such tax bribery include the Credit for Increasing Research Activities (the ―R&D Credit‖), I.R.C. 
§ 41 (2006); the Low-Income Housing Credit, I.R.C. § 42 (2006); the deduction of income attributable 
to domestic production Activities (the ―Domestic Production Activities Deduction‖), I.R.C. § 199 
(2006); and accelerated depreciation of both fixed assets, I.R.C. § 168 (2006), and certain intangible 
assets, I.R.C. § 197 (2006). 
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This Note will briefly discuss what constitutes carried interest and 
general tax policies and considerations. It will then discuss carried interest 
tax legislation recently proposed by Congress, address the legislation’s 
shortcomings, and propose an alternative carried interest taxation regime. 
Lastly, it will address opportunities available to Congress for utilizing 
carried interest tax legislation as a means to obtain policy objectives. 
A. General Policy Overview 
Carried interest taxation can be best modified by Congressional 
statute.
6
 Congress generally considers a number of policy objectives and 
 
 
 6. Technically, tax law can also be modified by constitutional amendment. Of the twenty-seven 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (at the time of this Note’s publication), only one, the Sixteenth 
Amendment, has been ratified for the purpose of changing U.S. federal income tax law. See U.S. 
CONST. amend. XVI. The Sixteenth Amendment was ratified in order to empower Congress to enact 
direct income taxes without the need for apportionment amongst the several states based upon the 
census, and specifically to overrule Pollock v. Farmers‟ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429 
(1895), aff‟d on reh‟g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). In Pollock I, the Supreme Court held that income taxes on 
income from real property, including rents, were direct taxes. Id. at 573, 580–81, 583. Pollock v. 
Farmers‟ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollack II), 158 U.S. 601 (1895), reconsidered and broadened this 
holding, finding that taxes on income from both real and personal property (rent), as well as interest 
(from bonds) and dividends (from stocks), were direct taxes. Id. at 637. Accordingly, Pollock I and 
Pollock II held that Congress could only impose such taxes by means of apportionment amongst the 
States. The Sixteenth Amendment overruled these joint holdings and enabled Congress to impose such 
taxes upon income without regard to apportionment amongst the States. 
 One other amendment has technically modified the federal government’s taxing powers. The 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibits the imposition of poll taxes or other taxes which could impair 
individuals’ rights to vote in federal elections, by either the U.S. Federal Government or the 
governments of the several states. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. However, the purpose of the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment was not to constrain Congress’ taxing power or its ability to raise revenue, 
but rather to prohibit the effective disfranchisement of individuals by either Congress or the several 
states. At the time of the ratification of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (1964), many states still 
discriminated against certain individuals on the basis of race, and Congress was finally beginning to 
comprehensively address this injustice by means of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965. 
 Courts also decline to deny the benefits of a generally applicable tax provision to a specific subset 
of persons. Any legal challenge to the applicability of the existing tax regime to carried interest earned 
by fund managers or others would almost certainly be dismissed due to lack of standing. Cf. 
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486–89 (1923) (holding that an individual plaintiff lacked 
standing to pursue a claim regarding application of federal income tax law). Individual taxpayers have 
been permitted to maintain suits in very limited circumstances. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102–
03 (1968) (establishing a two-prong test for taxpayers to demonstrate that an unconstitutional 
enactment, including tax legislation, has caused them injury). Flast has since been sharply curtailed 
and is inapplicable in instances in which the power exercised is clearly constitutional. See, e.g., Hein v. 
Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 593, 603 (2007). Because Congress clearly has the 
power to tax income from services, its decision to do so in a general or uniform manner should be 
immune to taxpayer challenges in courts, leaving it with the sole power to modify the existing carried 
interest taxation regime. Although a taxpayer subject to a tax may challenge its validity, there are two 
considerations that prevent this from being relevant in a carried interest context. First, such challenges 
rarely prevail at striking Internal Revenue Code provisions. At best, challenges usually only enable a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss2/5
  
 
 
 
 
2011] TAXATION OF CARRIED INTEREST 451 
 
 
 
 
considerations when enacting tax legislation.
7
 The interplay between these 
considerations is complex, and these objectives alternately complement 
and conflict with each other. Because taxation is an integral part of a 
comprehensive fiscal policy, Congress’ primary objectives should be to 
promote economic growth, to promote economic (and price) stability, and 
to raise revenue to fund general and specific expenditures.
8
 In light of 
these objectives, some of Congress’ primary tax policy considerations 
include administrability, promotion of taxpayer compliance, equity 
(including both horizontal equity and vertical equity), economic neutrality, 
and economic incentivization.
9
 As a general proposition, it is worth noting 
 
 
taxpayer to obtain a court’s blessing to apply its understanding of the relevant income tax provisions to 
the particular facts and circumstances of the case. See generally Michael I. Saltzman & Leslie Book, 
IRS Practice and Procedure, ¶¶ 1.03, 1.05–07 (2011). Second, because the existing regime generally 
treats carried interest income favorably, no rational taxpayer earning carried interest income will 
challenge it. 
 As a final matter, the U.S. Department of the Treasury is entitled to draft regulations to interpret 
and apply the tax law enacted by Congress. Because no extant enactment distinguishes between carried 
interest income and other income from partnerships, and the Treasury cannot unilaterally promulgate 
tax regulations without a corresponding Internal Revenue Code provision, the Treasury will likely be 
limited in what it can unilaterally implement. Cf. I.R.C. § 7805 (authorizing the Secretary of the 
Treasury to prescribe rules and regulations for the enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code). 
Although its grant of authority is broad, I.R.C. § 7805 should not be interpreted to permit the Secretary 
of the Treasury to unilaterally enact tax provisions without a corresponding Internal Revenue Code 
provision. Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(establishing the so-called ―Chevron Deference‖ standard of administrative deference, whereby courts 
generally should defer to administrative agencies’ guidance if such guidance is based upon a 
reasonable construction of the relevant statute); Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United 
States. 131 S. Ct. 704, 711–14 (2011) (holding that Treasury’s I.R.C. § 7805 authority should be 
interpreted broadly and subjected to Chevron deference).  
 However, it is worth noting that Professor Rosenzweig has proposed a possible method by which 
the Treasury can alter carried interest taxation by means of regulations which could be promulgated 
under existing statutory authority. Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 755–62 & n.229. While I believe that 
Professor Rosenzweig’s proposal to apply a short-term holding period to carried interest capital gains 
could be effective, I also believe it to be suboptimal because it allows substantial shielding of carried 
interest by capital losses and appears to be based more upon ease of execution than conceptual 
accuracy. 
 7. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 13–20 (1984) 
[hereinafter TREASURY 1984]; Charles E. McLure, Jr., Where Tax Reform Went Astray, 31 VILL. L. 
REV. 1619, 1622–23 (1986); Nancy E. Shurtz, A Critical View of Traditional Tax Policy Theory: A 
Pragmatic Alternative, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1665, 1667 (1986). 
 8. I believe that a proper analysis of tax policy should evaluate tax policy in the context of 
broader fiscal policy, which should in turn be considered (along with such items as monetary policy) 
as part of an overall economic policy. Some practitioners group broader fiscal policy goals with more 
specific goals of tax policy. See, e.g., TREASURY 1984, supra note 7, at 13–20; WILLIAM D. ANDREWS 
& PETER J. WIEDENBECK, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 8–10 (6th ed. 2009); Nancy Staudt et 
al., Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1957–59 (2005). 
 9. See, e.g., ANDREWS & WIEDENBECK, supra note 8, at 8–10; McLure, supra note 7; Shurtz, 
supra note 7; Staudt et al., supra note 8 at 1957–59. 
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that a tax regime should minimally impact individual decision-makers 
choices, unless the legislature enacting a particular tax policy specifically 
seeks to either incentivize or discourage specific behavior or outcomes. 
Administrability focuses on the ease with which the U.S. federal 
government can administer and enforce the Internal Revenue Code, and 
the Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder.
10
 The law, including the 
Internal Revenue Code, is only as effective as the government’s ability to 
enforce it. Promotion of taxpayer compliance focuses on both 
dissemination of information about the tax law to the taxpayers and the 
burden imposed on the taxpayers in understanding and complying with the 
Internal Revenue Code.
11
 Provisions which are excessively cumbersome or 
costly are often prone to noncompliance, either due to willful disregard or 
unintentional error. Furthermore, courts have recognized the importance of 
administrability and promotion of taxpayer compliance by permitting the 
use of estimates for certain tax deductions, notwithstanding the general 
burden of proof imposed upon taxpayers in disputes with the Internal 
Revenue Service.
12
 
Equity focuses on the fundamental fairness of a tax system. Horizontal 
equity and vertical equity are intrinsically related, but focus on different 
aspects of the overall fairness of a tax system. Horizontal equity focuses 
on treating similarly situated taxpayers similarly.
13
 Vertical equity focuses 
on permitting (and sometimes encouraging) different treatment of 
differently situated taxpayers.
14
 One of the key components of a 
horizontally equitable system is a focus on economic substance over legal 
form. Focusing on the economic substance should result in the imposition 
of similar tax burdens on taxpayers in similar economic positions. A key 
component of a vertically equitable system is a nonregressive tax 
structure.
15
 Tax systems that are either proportionate
16
 or progressive
17
 
 
 
 10. See, e.g., Shurtz, supra note 7, at 1667. 
 11. Id. at 1680. 
 12. See, e.g., Cohan v. Comm’r, 39 F.2d 540, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1930) (establishing the so-called 
―Cohan Rule,‖ which generally permits taxpayers to use reasonable estimates for deductions, so long 
as (1) a deduction is allowed and (2) substantiation is not required); see also I.R.C. § 7491 (2006) 
(generally providing that taxpayers bear the burden of proof in court cases, but permitting a burden 
shift when taxpayers produce credible evidence to support their position); I.R.C. § 7454(a) (2006) 
(imposing burden on Secretary in cases involving fraud). However, it is worth noting that Congress 
can override this rule and has done so in limited circumstances. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 274(d) (2006). 
 13. See, e.g., Shurtz, supra note 7, at 1669. 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 1671. 
 15. A regressive tax system imposes a higher average tax rate on lower-income taxpayers. Such a 
system may (and usually does) impose a higher absolute-dollar tax burden on higher-income 
taxpayers, albeit at a lower marginal tax rate. However, this is not a per se requirement economically, 
and higher-income taxpayers may be subject to a lower absolute-dollar tax burden than lower-income 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss2/5
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may be considered vertically equitable, but many proponents of vertical 
equity promote progressive income tax regimes.
18
 Tax systems should be 
considered as integrated systems. Because income taxes are only one 
component of an integrated tax system,
19
 and because other components of 
an integrated tax system have different impacts on differently situated 
taxpayers,
20
 a progressive income tax regime might be necessary to ensure 
that an integrated tax system is nonregressive. 
 
 
taxpayers—either through negative marginal tax rates or through the imposition of higher consumption 
taxes on a mix of goods favored by lower-income taxpayers. 
 16. A proportionate tax system imposes a uniform (average) tax rate on all taxpayers, regardless 
of their income. Such a system imposes a higher absolute-dollar tax burden on higher-income 
taxpayers. 
 17. A progressive tax system imposes a higher average tax rate on higher-income taxpayers. 
Such a system imposes a higher absolute-dollar tax burden on higher-income taxpayers, (moreso than 
a proportionate tax system). Progressive tax systems generally involve higher marginal income tax 
rates for higher-income taxpayers, although luxury consumption taxes may also be considered a part of 
a progressive tax system. 
 18. See Shurtz, supra note 7, at 1671. 
 19. Other components of an integrated tax system may include, inter alia, consumption taxes 
(e.g., sales taxes), employment taxes (e.g., Social Security and Medicare/Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (FICA)/Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA) taxes), unemployment taxes 
(e.g., Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)/State Unemployment Tax Act (SUTA)), property taxes 
(both real property and personal property), excise taxes (e.g., ―sins‖—such as tobacco, alcohol, and 
gambling—as well as other items, such as certain types of manufactured goods or extracted natural 
resources), transfer taxes (e.g., estate and gift taxes), tariffs, Value Added Taxes (VAT), and export 
taxes. At the time this Note was published, the U.S. was using all of the aforementioned taxes except 
for VAT and export taxes. Export taxes are unconstitutional. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5; § 10 cl. 2. 
 20. Generally speaking, the progressivity of an income tax is determined both by reference to its 
explicit rate structure and to its tax base structure. To the extent that a tax base might vary based upon 
income, it might also contribute to or detract from the progressivity of a tax system. The progressivity 
of employment taxes, unemployment taxes, and transfer taxes also depends upon the explicit rate 
structure and the tax base. Within the U.S., employment and unemployment taxes tend to be regressive 
because the rates are nonprogressive and the tax base is capped. Specifically, the Social Security and 
unemployment taxes are regressive because they apply a uniform tax rate to certain types of income up 
to a statutory threshold, but they do not impose any additional tax on income above that threshold. The 
Medicare tax was historically regressive even though it had a uniform tax rate on an unlimited income 
tax base because certain types of income associated with high-income individuals (e.g., interest, 
dividends, and capital gains) were excluded from the base. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), generally reversed this by subjecting high incomes to 
an additional incremental Medicare tax and by creating the new I.R.C. § 1411 tax—which is analogous 
to the Medicare component of the SECA tax but is imposed on most unearned income not otherwise 
subject to SECA taxes. Cf. I.R.C. § 1411(c)(6) (Supp. 2010). In the U.S., transfer taxes tend to be very 
strongly progressive. The estate and gift taxes only apply to estates and gifts in excess of a statutory 
threshold, and the statutory threshold is high enough to exclude most estates and gifts. Furthermore, 
the estate and gift tax rate structure is very progressive. 
 The progressivity of consumption taxes, excise taxes, VAT, and tariffs tends to be more focused 
on the mix of goods subject to such taxes. Taxes on luxury goods tend to be more progressive. Taxes 
on other goods are often less so. Moreover, because higher-income individuals are more likely to be 
able to save some of their income (or to ―consume‖ wealth or future benefits, rather than immediate 
benefits), consumption taxes might be inherently regressive.  
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Economic neutrality focuses on avoiding ―tax distortion,‖ which is a 
change in a taxpayer’s preferences or decisions due to a tax system.21 
Economic incentivization is the polar opposite of economic neutrality—it 
is the intent to encourage taxpayers to engage in certain conduct or 
consume certain goods (or, alternatively, to discourage certain conduct or 
the consumption of particular goods) by means of a tax system.
22
 If an 
income tax is applied uniformly on all income and all income is taxed, 
then that tax should be somewhat economically neutral because each 
individual’s profit-maximizing behavior will generally encourage the same 
conduct. However, because taxes might increase taxpayers’ marginal 
preferences for leisure over work, or for consumption over saving, most 
taxes which are not uniform per capita levies will not be perfectly 
economically neutral.
23
 On the other hand, Congress, at times, seeks to 
incentivize certain behaviors, such as the purchase of certain clean energy 
vehicles and energy efficient appliances.
24
 Congress also seeks to 
discourage certain other behaviors, such as using corporations as personal 
savings vehicles or assisting unsanctioned international boycotts or storing 
passive income-producing assets in foreign corporations.
25
 Although the 
tax code may seem to be something of a sledgehammer when it comes to 
incentivization, because it is often imprecisely targeted and may cause 
unforeseeable consequences, it is one of the most effective and easily-
administrable means by which Congress can promote particular policies 
that require taxpayer buy-in.
26
 
It is also worth noting that a taxpayer is appropriately entitled to pay 
the lowest rate of tax imposed upon it by the Internal Revenue Code. 
Persons who are subject to favorable tax rates on carried interest income 
are not necessarily greedy or unethical; rather, some of their income is 
merely eligible for preferred rates under current law. As Judge Learned 
Hand aptly stated in Helvering v. Gregory,
27
 ―Any one may so arrange his 
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose 
 
 
 21. See McLure, supra note 7, at 1624–25. 
 22. See id. at 1626. 
 23. See, e.g., TREASURY 1984, supra note 7, at 13. It is also worth noting that because uniform 
levies involve a fixed tax and a zero percent incremental tax rate, they are brutally regressive and are 
therefore extremely violative of vertical equity. 
 24. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 25D, 30, 30B–D, 45M (Supp. 2010). 
 25. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 541–47, 908, 951–64, 999, 1291–98 (Supp. 2010). 
 26. Cf. TREASURY 1984, supra note 7, at 15 (discussing the use of tax policy as a means of 
subsidy); Staudt et al., supra note 8, at 1958 & n.174. See generally Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Paternalism 
and Income Tax Reform, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 675 (1985). 
 27. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934). 
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that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic 
duty to increase one’s taxes.‖28 
B. Definition of Carried Interest & Related Background Information 
Carried interest is a mechanism employed by many investment funds to 
compensate fund managers for delivering strong fund-level investment 
performance.
29
 It is generally an allocation to the fund managers of a 
percentage of partnership income without a corresponding interest in the 
partnership’s capital.30 Most investment funds are structured as either 
limited partnerships or limited liability companies
31
 and are treated as 
partnerships for U.S. federal income tax purposes.
32
 Accordingly, the 
income of the funds is subject to tax at the partner level when it is realized 
and recognized at the partnership level, subject to partnership-level 
elections.
33
 Items of partnership income generally retain their underlying 
character when they ―pass through‖ to the partners.34 Allocations of 
 
 
 28. Id. at 810. 
 29. See David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 
715, 716 n.1 (2008). See generally Andrew W. Needham & Anita Beth Adams, ―Private Equity 
Funds,‖ 735-2d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) U.S.-Income (2010). 
 30. Weisbach, supra note 29, at 716 n.1. The measure of carried interest varies by fund, and is 
usually defined in the fund documents. Often, carried interest is only earned if a fund exceeds a target 
performance metric. If the carry is only earned on the amount by which a fund exceeds a target metric, 
then the fund is said to provide a ―preferred return‖ to investors (and the target metric embodies that 
preferred return). If the carry is earned on all fund income and the fund exceeds a target metric, that 
target metric is referred to as a ―hurdle rate.‖ See generally Needham & Adams, supra note 29. 
 31. This is an extreme oversimplification of actual fund structures. Most funds are comprised of 
multiple levels of entities in order to optimize fund efficiencies in terms of general administration and 
costs, as well as taxes. Two major classes of fund structures are the parallel fund structure and the 
master-feeder structure. Recently, a new structure, called a mini-feeder structure, has increased in 
popularity. Specific discussion of these structures is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 Often, funds employ a fee structure whereby two separate fees are charged: a management fee and 
an incentive fee. The management fee, usually about 2 percent, is often paid to a management 
company, which is often an affiliate of the general partner (GP) (who is not actually a partner in the 
fund). The incentive fee is the carried interest, and it is usually about 20 percent of the fund’s profits 
and generally allocated to the GP (In order to ensure pass-through of character of income, the 
allocation must be made to a partner.). Often, the GP is an LLC or S corporation. See Rosenzweig, 
supra note 1, at 718. 
 For additional background information on various funds, see generally GERALD LINS ET AL., 
HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE (2010–2011 ed.). 
 32. See I.R.C. § 7701 (2006); Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1–301.7701-2 (2009), 301.7701-3 (2006); 
Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 718. 
 33. See I.R.C. §§ 701–703(b) (2006). As a side note, it is worth mentioning that tax-exempt 
partners are only generally subject to tax on the Unrelated Business Taxable Income (UBTI) portion of 
the partnership income. Generally, if there is no debt-financing (at the partner or partnership level), 
then dividends, interest, and capital gains should not constitute UBTI. See I.R.C. §§ 511, 512(a)(1), 
(b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(5), 514 (2006). Many investors in investment funds are tax-exempt. 
 34. See I.R.C. § 702(a), (b). 
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partnership income, such as carried interest, are considered special 
allocations and retain their character when passed through to the 
partners.
35
 
Under current law, the receipt of a profits interest in a partnership 
without a corresponding capital interest generally does not result in any 
immediate taxation.
36
 Income (both general net income and separately 
stated items) is computed at the partnership level; the partnership then 
allocates income to the partners. Each partner is taxed on all income 
allocated to him or her, and the character of the income is determined at 
the partnership level and passed on to the partners.
37
 Each partner is then 
afforded a basis adjustment for his or her allocable share of the 
partnership’s total income or loss.38 Accordingly, under current law, the 
profits interest that entitles a fund manager to carried interest income is 
not taxed upon receipt by the manager, and all items of income that are 
allocated to the fund manager retain their initial character, as determined at 
the partnership level. 
C. Tax Policy Considerations of Current Carried Interest Taxation 
Regime 
As a matter of tax law, there are two conflicting viewpoints regarding 
carried interest taxation. Carried interest is generally a special allocation of 
partnership income.
39
 Accordingly, under general partnership taxation, it 
 
 
 35. See I.R.C. §§ 702, 704 (2006). Unlike an S corporation, which must allocate all items of 
income on a per-share-per-day basis, see I.R.C. §§ 1361(b)(1)(D), (c)(4), 1377(a)(1) (2006) (jointly 
requiring S corporations to have a single class of stock for purposes of distributions and allocations 
and applying pro rata allocation), partnerships have significant flexibility in how they allocate their 
income. A special allocation of partnership income provided for in the partnership agreement (or 
operating agreement for an LLC treated as a partnership for federal income tax purposes) will 
generally be respected for income tax purposes, so long as it has substantial economic effect. See 
I.R.C. § 704(a), (b). The concept of substantial economic effect is fairly complex, but generally, 
special allocations pursuant to a partnership agreement that provides that capital accounts will match 
tax allocations will likely be respected for federal income tax purposes, subject to certain targeted anti-
abuse rules. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (2008). 
 36. See Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191; Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. There are a 
few limited exceptions to this general rule, but they are rarely applicable, and most practitioners can 
easily avoid them. These exceptions are discussed in the aforementioned Revenue Procedures. 
 37. See I.R.C. §§ 702, 704. 
 38. See I.R.C. § 705 (2006). 
 39. Weisbach, supra note 29, at 716 n.1. By definition, an S corporation cannot have special 
allocations, although an S corporation can receive special allocations if it is a partner in a partnership. 
Corporations are only eligible for Subchapter S (pass-through taxation) if they maintain only a single 
class of stock. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D). Failure to maintain only a single class of stock can 
terminate an otherwise valid S election. See I.R.C. §§ 1361(b)(1), 1362(d)(2) (2006). Classes of 
common stock that are identical in all respects, except for differences solely in voting rights, are 
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may properly retain the character of its underlying source income (such as 
long-term capital gains, I.R.C. § 1231 gains, dividends, ordinary interest, 
tax-exempt interest, etc.).
40
 On the other hand, carried interest is not 
merely an allocation of income between separate passive partners, but 
rather, it is a means of compensating managing partners for their services 
in managing an investment fund to achieve specific returns.
41
 Many critics 
of current carried interest taxation focus on the fact that compensation for 
services rendered is generally taxed as ordinary income, and therefore, 
permitting carried interest to be subject to potentially preferential tax rates 
(including long-term capital gains tax rates) effectively provides a tax 
subsidy to investment fund managers.
42
 From a tax policy perspective, 
taxing carried interest as ordinary income would promote horizontal equity 
(by taxing it like other compensation for services), vertical equity (because 
 
 
considered to be part of a single class of stock. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(4). Furthermore, actual ―straight debt‖ 
is also not considered a separate class of stock. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(5). Classes of common stock 
providing for varying distribution rights fit within neither such heading, and should cause automatic 
termination of S corporation status. 
 40. See I.R.C. § 702. 
 41. Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 723–24. 
Although the specific thresholds (―hurdle rates‖) required for partners to earn carried interest vary, 
they will be defined in a partnership agreement or LLC operating agreement. Oftentimes, a threshold 
might be a measure of the ―market,‖ such as the S&P 500, the Russell 1000, the Russell 2000, the 
Russell 3000, or the Wilshire 5000. See, e.g., ALEXANDER INEICHEN, AIMA’S ROADMAP TO HEDGE 
FUNDS 28 (2008), available at http://www.aima.org/download.cfm/docid/6133E854-63FF-46FC-
95347B445AE4ECFC (discussing hedge funds); Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of 
Private Equity Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2303, 2309–11 (2010) (discussing private equity funds). 
Some funds (more often hedge funds than private equity funds) often provide for ―high-water marks‖ 
whereby managers can only earn carried interest if the fund exceeds its highest previous return 
(possibly with an adjustment (often upward only) for expected market gains using its market measure). 
See, e.g., INEICHEN, supra; Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 721 n.36 (citation omitted). However, 
without a ―clawback,‖ which would cause managers to forfeit previously earned carried interest if 
subsequent fund performance failed to exceed the relevant threshold, this is often insufficient. As soon 
as it appears that a fund will be unlikely to exceed its high-water mark, then fund managers may 
liquidate their old funds and organize a new fund to purge the high-water mark threshold. This might 
be less of a concern for private equity funds, however, because they often have fixed investment 
horizons and receive capital over time in the form of capital commitments and capital calls. See, e.g., 
Metrick & Yasuda, supra at 2307, 2312–13. With respect to hedge funds, this might cause some 
additional turbulence in the market, but it might also permit investors to exit the fund and provide 
some social benefit. An efficient result could ensue if investors had the opportunity to ―rollover‖ their 
investment in the old fund into the new fund or instead redeem their fund interest without penalty. 
With respect to private equity funds, a clawback is often necessary to ensure that fund managers 
cannot profit at their investors’ expense by liquidating investments with returns in excess of hurdle 
rates in years prior to liquidating investments with returns that do not exceed hurdle rates. 
 42. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 1, at 695. It is worth noting that many fund managers are high-
income taxpayers. Accordingly, in effect, carried interest provides a tax subsidy to some of the 
wealthiest taxpayers. Some commentators have addressed the perversity of this result. See, e.g., Jones, 
supra note 1. 
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fund managers can ―afford‖ the taxes), and economic neutrality (because 
individuals who are seeking high-income professions should not make the 
choice between being a fund manager and being a doctor or an investment 
banker solely on account of tax treatment of compensation). The existing 
carried interest tax regime provides uniform tax treatment to partnerships, 
is relatively administratively convenient, and promotes taxpayer 
compliance because substantial factual analysis is not currently necessary 
to differentiate between specially allocated income from investment 
services partnerships and income from other partnerships. This Note will 
briefly revisit the tax policy considerations of carried interest taxation in 
Part IV after discussing various alternatives. 
II. CONGRESS’ RECENT CARRIED INTEREST TAXATION PROPOSAL 
A. Proposed I.R.C. § 710. 
The May 28, 2010, House version of the American Jobs and Closing 
Tax Loopholes Act of 2010
43
 contained a provision to reform carried 
interest taxation, ―Proposed I.R.C. § 710.‖44 The final, enacted version of 
the Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2010 did not include 
Proposed I.R.C. § 710. However, because Proposed I.R.C. § 710 has 
already been drafted by Congress in accordance with Congressional 
legislation standards, it is worth analyzing, in no small part because it can 
be readily included in a future bill.
45
 
Proposed I.R.C. § 710 generally provides that carried interest income 
will be taxed as ordinary income and that carried interest losses, while 
generally taxable as ordinary losses, are only deductible to the extent of 
carried interest income earned in prior years.
46
 In the event of a sale of an 
―investment services partnership interest,‖ any gain will be taxed as 
 
 
 43. Pub. L. No. 111-205, 124 Stat. 1235 (2010). As ultimately enacted, this Public Law was 
referred to as the Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2010. Id. § 1. 
 44. H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. § 412(a) (as engrossed by House, May 28, 2010). 
 45. This Note addresses the House proposals from engrossed House Bill 4213. Congress has 
since considered other proposals to tax carried interest as ordinary income, see, e.g., H.R. 2495, 112th 
Cong. § 501 (as introduced in the House on July 11, 2011), but many of these proposals are more 
misguided than House Bill 4213. For example, as discussed, House Bill 4213 could theoretically 
subject active trades or businesses to carried interest limitations, whereas an optimal carried interest 
regime would not do so. House Bill 2495 provides for similarly ludicrous treatment, without any 
attempt to limit the scope of carried interest reform to investment services partnerships. Because, in the 
author’s view, House Bill 4213 provides the best starting point of the proposed pieces of legislation, it 
will be the main point of comparison for this Note. 
 46. See H.R. 4213 § 412(a) (Proposed I.R.C. § 710(a)(1), (2)). 
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ordinary income, but loss will only be recharacterized as ordinary loss to 
the extent of prior years’ net income, net of any prior years’ previously 
allowed losses.
47
 Proposed I.R.C. § 710 also overrides the general 
partnership rules regarding distributions of partnership property and 
instead provides that such distributions are generally immediately taxable 
as though they are distributions of money.
48
 Investment services 
partnership interests are generally defined as interests in partnerships that 
advise, manage, acquire, dispose, or finance the acquisition of certain 
assets (usually stocks, securities, real estate, options and derivatives, 
interests in partnerships, or certain other assets (primarily investment 
assets)), or that provide related support services.
49
 Exceptions are 
generally made for income allocations to capital interests not in excess of 
the capital interest’s capital percentages, as long as those interests are 
attributable to either property contributed to the partnership or income 
previously recognized by the partner.
50
 Proposed I.R.C. § 710 also 
provides that income from certain interests in entities, whose values are 
related to performance of investment management services by the 
taxpayer, is taxed as ordinary income.
51
 The interests subject to this 
provision generally exclude partnership interests and interests in most C 
and S corporations.
52
 
 
 
 47. Id. (Proposed I.R.C. § 710(b)(1), (2)). Proposed I.R.C. § 710(b) does not explicitly provide 
that loss in excess of prior years’ net income is treated as capital loss, but rather, it only recharacterizes 
loss as ordinary loss to the extent of prior years’ net income. Accordingly, to the extent that the loss on 
disposition exceeds prior years’ ordinary income, that excess will retain its original character. It is 
worth noting, however, that because ordinary losses are allowed only to the extent of prior years’ net 
income, some previously incurred but not previously allowed losses might be subsequently 
recharacterized as capital losses. 
 48. See H.R. 4213 § 412(a) (Proposed I.R.C. § 710(b)(6)). 
 49. See id. (Proposed I.R.C. § 710(c)). It is worth noting that the language in Proposed I.R.C. 
§ 710(c)(2), referring to interests in partnerships, makes no mention as to the purpose or function of 
the investee partnerships. Accordingly, Proposed I.R.C. § 710 might subject tiered operating 
partnerships to taxation at ordinary income rates if they are unable to avail themselves of the special 
rules under Proposed I.R.C. § 710(d)(4) for tiered partnerships. While proper planning could likely 
mitigate this impact (by means of including debt financing or matching capital interests to profits 
interests), smaller businesses that might simply be seeking to avail themselves of a single level of 
taxation (through LLC structures) and that lack the resources for elegant tax planning might find 
themselves subject to Proposed I.R.C. § 710’s recharacterizations. In effect, as currently drafted, 
Proposed I.R.C. § 710 might penalize a group of persons that it does not seek to impair. Yet it might 
fail to tax those who it seeks to tax but who can afford effective tax counsel. Proposed I.R.C. 710 is 
therefore both over- and under-inclusive. 
 50. See H.R. 4213 § 412(a) (Proposed I.R.C. § 710(d)(1), (7)). 
 51. See id. (Proposed I.R.C. § 710(e)). 
 52. Id. (Proposed I.R.C. § 710(e)(2)(A)(ii)). 
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Proposed I.R.C. § 710 applies to all taxpayers, including both 
individuals and corporations.
53
 Individuals are afforded some relief in the 
form of an ―applicable percentage,‖ which permits a certain percentage of 
net income or loss or disposition gain or loss to be taxed under the 
previous preferential tax regime.
54
 However, corporations are ineligible for 
this benefit.
55
 
Proposed tax adjustments that were excluded from the final version of 
House Bill 4213 included both Proposed I.R.C. § 710, as well as 
additional proposed amendments to the Internal Revenue Code relating to 
investment services partnerships. These additional proposed amendments 
included subjecting persons who own certain interests related to 
investment management services to enhanced underpayment of tax 
 
 
 53. Id. (Proposed I.R.C. § 710(c)(1)). Proposed I.R.C. § 710(a) does not make any reference to 
taxpayers. Proposed I.R.C. § 710(c)(1) defines ―investment services partnership interest‖ as ―any 
interest in a partnership which is held . . . by any person‖ who meets certain requirements. Id. 
(emphasis added). The use of the phrase ―any person‖ in Proposed I.R.C. § 710(c), combined with the 
absence of any limitations on which persons are subject to Proposed I.R.C. § 710, means that 
individuals and corporations (and other taxpayers) are subject to its recharacterization provisions. Cf. 
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (2006) (generally defining the term ―person‖ for purposes of the Internal Revenue 
Code, subject to express modifications in specific provisions). Furthermore, Proposed I.R.C. § 710(g) 
provides for special rules for individuals, which confirms, by implication, that corporations are also 
subject to the general rules.  
 54. H.R. 4213 § 412(a) (Proposed I.R.C. § 710(g)). This would serve to enable a portion of 
carried interest income to retain its original character (by recharacterizing only a portion as ordinary 
income). The portion recharacterized would be 50 percent for tax years beginning before 2013 and 75 
percent for tax years beginning thereafter. Id. (Proposed I.R.C. § 710(g)(7)). From a policy 
perspective, the most apparent reason for this provision is compromise. The version of Proposed I.R.C. 
§ 710 in House Bill 2495 excludes this relief. See H.R. 2495, 112th Cong. § 502(a). 
 55. See H.R. 4213 § 412(a) (Proposed I.R.C. § 710(g)) (titled ―Special Rules for Individuals‖) 
(emphasis added). While it is appropriate to subject S corporations to these measures for carried 
interest taxation, on account of the fact that S corporations can be used as management entities for 
partnerships or LLCs, it seems almost odd to subject C corporations to these measures. The net effect 
of most of these provisions on C corporations will be to limit and defer deductibility of ordinary losses 
until the partnership has sufficient income to offset the previously incurred losses and to convert 
ordinary operating losses into much harder to deduct capital losses, upon disposition of partnership 
interests. 
 Because Proposed I.R.C. § 710(c)(2) refers, by reference, to any stock as being considered a 
―specified asset,‖ Proposed I.R.C. § 710 will subject any corporate partner in a joint venture that has 
an investment in corporate stock or a partnership, receives a special allocation, and performs any 
service described in Proposed I.R.C. § 710(c)(1) to the aforementioned potentially punitive tax 
treatment. Proposed I.R.C. § 710 might require such a broad net (declining to provide an exemption 
for high-percentage ownership or 100 percent ownership stakes) in order to subject private equity 
funds to its provisions. Yet it might be more efficient to exempt C corporation partners from the 
provisions of Proposed I.R.C. § 710, with a possible offset and recapture to the extent that the 
corporate partner makes a subsequent Subchapter S election to the extent required to prevent abuse. 
Furthermore, active trades or businesses unrelated to investments should be exempt from the 
provisions of any carried interest reform. 
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penalties,
56
 conforming adjustments to publicly traded partnership rules,
57
 
and adjusting net earnings from self-employment subject to SECA.
58
 
B. Critique of Proposed I.R.C. § 710 
Proposed I.R.C. § 710 is a good barometer of the current climate of 
proposed carried interest taxation legislation. It has both some very strong 
points and some glaring weaknesses. While it is a good starting point for 
discussion, it appears to be more of an ill-considered compromise than a 
well-conceived theoretical and practical method of taxing carried interest. 
Proposed I.R.C. § 710 jumpstarts the carried interest discussion by 
actually proposing to tax carried interest income as ordinary income. 
While this seems mundane, the fact that Proposed I.R.C. § 710 attempts to 
provide a comprehensive regime for the taxation of carried interest income 
is a major breakthrough. Prior to Proposed I.R.C. § 710, many proposals 
were bandied about, but few, if any, addressed even most of the relevant 
interests at stake.
59
 
Proposed I.R.C. § 710 also subjects carried interest income to social 
insurance taxes.
60
 Although fund managers will often be subject to only 
Medicare taxes on their marginal income,
61
 there are currently many 
 
 
 56. See H.R. 4213 § 412(c)(1) (Proposed I.R.C. § 6662(b)(8)); id. § 412(c)(2)(A) (Proposed 
I.R.C. § 6662(k)). Generally, a 20 percent penalty is applicable to underpayments of tax. However, for 
certain underpayments relating to Proposed I.R.C. § 710(e), the penalty would be 40 percent. See id. 
§ 412(c)(1), (2)(A). 
 57. See id. § 412(b) (Proposed I.R.C. § 7704(b)(6)). 
 58. See id. § 412(d)(1) (Proposed I.R.C. § 1402(a)(18)). The proposed adjustments to House Bill 
4213 also provided for inclusion of certain S corporation income in taxpayers’ SECA tax base, 
including adjustments for family members’ shares of S corporation income. Id. This provision was 
also not adopted. 
 59. See, e.g., Stephen M. Breitstone, Carried Interest Bill—A „Death Trap‟ for Real Estate 
Partnerships, 128 TAX NOTES 1459 (2009). 
 60. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Since I.R.C. § 1411 (Supp. 2010) was enacted, 
carried interests may be subject to the Medicare tax. However, House Bill 4213 proposed to subject 
carried interests to both the Medicare and Social Security taxes. See supra note 58. 
 61. See I.R.C. §§ 1401, 1402(b) (2006). Under current law, earnings from self-employment in 
excess of a statutory threshold are only subject to the 2.90% Medicare component of the SECA tax 
(3.8% in excess of $200,000 for most filers, $250,000 for married filers filing jointly, and $125,000 for 
married filers filing separately). Earnings from self-employment below that threshold are subject to 
both the 12.40% Social Security and the 2.90% Medicare components of the SECA tax. Fund 
managers earning more than $106,800 (during 2011) (of wages subject to SECA) are only subject to 
the Medicare component of SECA on their marginal income. The Social Security tax wage limit of 
$106,800 is effective for 2011. See I.R.S., PUBLICATION 15: (CIRCULAR E), EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE 
(2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p15/ar02.html#en_US_2011_publink1000202 
402. 
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proposals to increase the income base subjected to Social Security taxes.
62
 
Proposed I.R.C. § 710 also has a number of shortcomings. As 
discussed previously in Part II.A,
63
 C corporations are effectively 
penalized by this regime because they currently receive minimal benefit 
from carried interest but are likely to have legitimate business deductions 
deferred or possibly disallowed due to Proposed I.R.C. § 710’s 
overbreadth.
64
 Any proper carried interest taxation regime should exclude 
C corporations from its scope of taxpayers affected.
65
 
Proposed I.R.C. § 710 also focuses on partnerships, rather than 
partners. This provision establishes artificial ―buckets‖ whereby carried 
interest income from one fund cannot be offset by carried interest losses 
from a different fund. This provision is of particular concern to fund 
managers because some may manage multiple separate funds. If a fund 
manager has a large loss in one fund but a small gain in a different one, 
then that manager might be treated by the Internal Revenue Service under 
Proposed I.R.C. § 710 as having taxable income, even though that 
manager has actually incurred a substantial economic loss from the sum of 
his or her labor.
66
 This result is further exacerbated by the fact that if the 
fund manager shuttered losing funds, it would only be able to treat most 
losses from those funds as capital losses and would be unable to use them 
to offset carried interest ordinary income.
67
 A result of this distortion is 
 
 
 62. Some of these proposals include completely eliminating the cap on income subject to Social 
Security taxes or alternatively, providing for a ―collar‖ subject to only the Medicare tax such that after 
income exceeds a second, higher threshold, it is subject to an additional social insurance tax. The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended 
I.R.C. § 1401 (SECA) and I.R.C. § 3101 (FICA) by adding a new Medicare surtax of 0.9% onto 
incomes in excess of $250,000 for joint returns, $125,000 for separate married returns, and $200,000 
for all other returns, and by adding I.R.C. § 1411. See discussion supra notes 20, 58, 60, 61. 
 63. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
 64. The fact that Proposed I.R.C. § 710 refers to qualified dividend income but not the dividends 
received deduction—the tax preference relating to dividends applicable to C corporations—suggests 
that the drafters of Proposed I.R.C. § 710 were not focused on C corporations. Rather, the chapters 
merely included C corporations in the scope of the provisions to ―cover all of their bases,‖ to penalize 
corporations (as a means of raising additional revenue), or as an oversight. However, the language of 
Proposed I.R.C. § 710(g) suggests that the inclusion of C corporations was not an oversight. See supra 
note 53. 
 65. It might be appropriate to consider subjecting closely held C corporations (or personal 
holding companies) to carried interest recharacterization provisions. See infra notes 73–76 and 
accompanying text. In addition, general active trades or businesses should be exempt from 
recharacterization. 
 66. Proper pass-through of carried interest should pass the taint of carried interest through GP 
entities to managers of GPs. 
 67. See H.R. 4213 § 412(a) (as engrossed by House, May 28, 2010) (Proposed I.R.C. § 710(a)(1), 
(a)(2), (b)); supra notes 46–52. Because most fund losses will result from declines in stock prices, they 
will often be taxed as capital losses unless they are subject to a specific statutory override. See I.R.C. 
§§ 165(f), 1211, 1212, 1221, 1222 (2006). Individuals are generally permitted to deduct an amount of 
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that fund managers might seek to focus on a single investment strategy. 
However, an incentive to do this already exists in the market in the form of 
risk and reward and expected return, and providing a large tax ―stick‖ is 
unlikely to advance this. A more likely result is that fund managers will 
either consolidate disparate investment strategies into a single fund or 
decrease the number of funds they manage. This outcome will likely result 
in a decrease in the number of funds available, a conglomeratization of 
fund strategies, or a combination of both. The net result of this 
development will be reduced investor selection, both in terms of fund 
strategies and actual numbers of funds. Reduced consumer (and by 
extension, investor) selection is often broadly regarded as an undesirable 
outcome.
68
 
One of the primary concerns that might have motivated some members 
of Congress to provide for partnership-level evaluation of carried interest 
is the notion that fund managers might seek to use losses from carried 
interests to offset gains from other income sources. This concern is largely 
overblown because most fund managers who have carried interests 
manage funds for a living; the primary reason for consideration of carried 
interest taxation reform is the fact that carried interest is, in effect, often a 
form of compensation for services subject to preferential tax rates. Taken 
together, it should be obvious why this concern is misplaced—most people 
would not seek to lose money performing their jobs. While some high-
income individuals seek to reduce their taxable income by use of tax 
shelters, such tax shelters are predominantly passive investments.
69
 
 
 
capital losses equal to their capital gains for the taxable year plus $3,000 ($1,500 if married filing 
separately); any excess capital loss may be carried forward indefinitely. See I.R.C. §§ 1211(b), 
1212(b). However, if a taxpayer has a $1,000,000 capital loss, and a $1,000,000 carried interest 
ordinary income gain, a $3,000 deduction will be both inequitable and economically distortive. 
 68. See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum 
Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977). 
 69. Congress has, in fact, previously addressed the problem of the use of tax shelters to shelter 
active income. Congress included one of its first major limitations on tax shelters in the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976), in the form of the At-Risk Limitations, which 
generally limited deductible losses to amounts deemed to be ―at-risk.‖ Currently, amounts deemed to 
be at-risk include the sum of invested capital, recourse financing, and certain limited ―qualified‖ non-
recourse financing. See generally I.R.C. § 465 (2006).  
 Congress added a more robust limitation on tax shelters in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), in the form of the Passive Loss Rules. The Passive Loss Rules are 
generally considered very effective at limiting the availability of passive losses. See generally I.R.C. 
§ 469 (2006). The Passive Loss Rules demonstrate that the determination of tax treatment should be 
made at the partner level, rather than the partnership level. Although partnerships report information 
about activities which may constitute passive losses to the partners, the partners are ultimately 
responsible for determining whether their investment in a partnership is a passive investment. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
464 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:449 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, it might be appropriate to simply permit fund managers to 
use carried interest losses to offset other income or, at the very least, 
income from other investments. 
III. MY PROPOSAL FOR CARRIED INTEREST TAXATION 
I will use the general concepts of Proposed I.R.C. § 710 as the starting 
point for the discussion regarding my proposal for carried interest taxation. 
I will do this both because it is a fairly comprehensive proposal and 
because it is readily available, thus saving the trouble of attempting to 
draft a proposal from scratch that would deal with the same subject matter. 
Also, it would be premature to reduce my proposal to a particular 
proposed enactment because it is more conceptual than applied. 
First, C corporations should be explicitly exempted from 
recharacterization of income under carried interest tax provisions. As 
discussed in Part II.A–B,70 carried interest recharacterization is punitive 
when applied to corporations because it generally defers deductions to 
which corporations are otherwise legitimately entitled and sometimes 
entirely disallows bona fide losses. Carried interest taxation should focus 
on ensuring that compensation for services is not eligible for artificial 
preferential tax rates without some significant affirmative policy 
consideration; because C corporations generally do not earn compensation 
for services, they should be exempt from this recharacterization. 
Furthermore, recharacterization may impede socially beneficial corporate 
development and evolution because joint ventures may be discouraged if 
they could subject their investors to a punitive tax regime. Lastly, it is 
worth noting that in the current tax environment, most individuals would 
not seek to use a C corporation as a means of avoiding carried interest 
recharacterization; because C corporations are subject to an entity-level 
tax, such a strategy would increase the effective tax rate applied to such 
shareholders’ income.71 If that is insufficient to dissuade the use of C 
corporations for purposes of avoiding carried interest recharacterization, 
 
 
Furthermore, partners are able to utilize their passive losses from one partnership to offset their passive 
income from other partnerships. See id. 
 70. See supra note 51–55, 63 and accompanying text. 
 71. This presumption against the use of corporations generally applies when corporate income 
tax rates are roughly equivalent to individual income tax rates. In the present U.S. tax environment, 
this presumption is appropriate. In other tax rate environments, this presumption might be 
inapplicable; if corporations are subject to lower tax rates than individuals, then income can generally 
be subject to reduced effective tax rates if it is retained by the corporation. 
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then that might be best addressed by reforming the Personal Holding 
Company tax regime.
72
 
Second, carried interest taxation should focus on the partners rather 
than the partnership. This entails a number of changes to Proposed I.R.C. 
§ 710. Initially, losses should not be trapped at the partnership level. 
Instead, the losses should flow through to the partners, as they otherwise 
would, and be subject to some form of suspension until the partners have 
sufficient income to offset them. This should be modeled on the Passive 
Loss Rules.
73
 This result can be accomplished by generally permitting 
carried interest losses to only be offset by carried interest gains, either 
through formal bucketing (i.e., ―carried interest capital losses,‖ as opposed 
to regular capital losses), or preferably, through a less formal 
recharacterization process. Ideally, carried interest losses should retain 
their original character, except that carried interest capital losses should be 
eligible for recharacterization as ordinary losses to the extent of 
unrecaptured recharacterized carried interest income.
74
 As a corollary to 
this point, investment services partnerships should be required to report 
information to their partners regarding carried interest, but no formal 
adjustments should be made at the partnership level.
75
  
Additionally, upon disposition, recharacterization should not freeze 
previously suspended losses as capital losses while taxing what would 
otherwise be capital gains as ordinary income. Again, one method to 
accomplish this is by modeling the eventual legislation after the Passive 
Loss Rules. Generally speaking, under the Passive Loss Rules, losses 
 
 
 72. I.R.C. §§ 531–565 provide generally for two regimes for taxing corporations used to 
improperly avoid the imposition of tax upon their shareholders: the Personal Holding Company 
regime, see I.R.C. §§ 541–547 (2006), and the Accumulated Earnings Tax Regime, see I.R.C. §§ 531–
537 (2006). Either could be properly used to combat attempts to shift carried interest income into a C 
corporation. 
 73. See generally I.R.C. § 469 (2006), and Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder. 
 74. Carried interest income should be recharacterized as ordinary income (i.e., ―recharacterized‖ 
carried interest income). To the extent that a partner has subsequent capital losses from carried 
interests, he or she should be able to ―recapture‖ those losses by ―recharacterizing‖ them as ordinary 
losses (thereby effectively offsetting the prior carried interest income). To the extent that a partner’s 
carried interest ordinary income still exceeds his or her carried interest capital losses that have been 
recharacterized as ordinary losses, he or she has unrecaptured recharacterized carried interest income. 
 75. From a quantitative perspective, this reporting should be fairly straightforward—to the extent 
that the partnership can look at the excess of each allocation over the amount that would have been 
allocated to a specific partner if the allocation had been made according to capital interests and report 
that amount as the potential carried interest pick-up.  
 From a compliance perspective, this requirement should be relatively innocuous. Partnerships 
already report significant amounts of information to their partners on Forms K-1 and attachments 
thereto. Because the quantitative computation required by the proposed reporting regime is minimal, 
the additional compliance burden, at least at the partnership level, should be equally minimal. 
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which have previously flowed through to a partner may be released from 
suspension upon termination of that partner’s entire interest in the passive 
activity.
76
 In the carried interest context, a similar provision could provide 
that upon termination of a carried interest any unrecaptured 
recharacterized carried interest income allocable to that carried interest 
would be recaptured as an ordinary loss to the extent of the loss on 
disposition.
77
 As a conceptual matter, this might be best achieved by 
renumbering Proposed I.R.C. § 710 as either § 449, § 470A, or § 484.
78
 
Although adjusting the basis limitations and netting procedures would 
require reworking much of Proposed I.R.C. § 710, the final legislation 
would be cleaner and more conceptually accurate. By focusing carried 
interest reform on partners receiving carried interests, rather than on 
partnerships that have carried interests, Congress can ensure that partners 
who do not receive carried interests are generally not impacted by any 
changes.
79
 
 
 
 76. See I.R.C. § 469(g). 
 77. If there is no loss on disposition, there should be no recapture. If there is a loss on 
disposition, it should be ―recaptured‖ but only to the extent of the lesser of the unrecaptured loss or the 
loss on disposition as an ordinary loss. 
 Additionally, the proposed provision should specifically delegate Treasury authority to write 
regulations to ensure that the provision functions properly. In particular, the rules for allocation of 
unrecaptured losses should provide for attributing recapture of such losses to the carried interest that 
had generated them to the extent that that carried interest later has carried interest income, and it 
should provide for an allocation of carried interest income from other carried interests to a carried 
interest loss to the extent that such loss is recaptured using carried interest income from other carried 
interests. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-1T (2010). 
 78. The purpose of renumbering Proposal I.R.C. § 710 is to provide a more logical framework to 
the provision and its location with respect to the general organization of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Because my proposed recharacterization is a partner-level recharacterization, it is more analogous to 
an accounting method than a partnership item. Technically, I.R.C. § 484 would be most appropriate 
because Proposed I.R.C. § 710 is an adjustment. I.R.C. § 449 would be more appropriate than I.R.C. 
§ 470A because Proposed I.R.C. § 710 is closer to an accounting method than a deduction. However, 
numbering Proposed I.R.C. § 710 as I.R.C. § 470A would place it near the At-Risk and Passive Loss 
rules, upon which it is modeled. Additionally, the partnership reporting requirement could be logically 
labeled I.R.C. § 710. Any such reporting requirement should be required for any disproportionate 
allocation of partnership income. However, actual tax treatment of the disproportionate allocation 
should be determined at the partner level. 
 One additional benefit of modeling carried interest reform on the At-Risk and Passive Loss Rules 
is that C corporations can be easily excluded from their application. Alternatively, if there is concern 
that closely held C corporations could become a source of abuse, then that too can be directly targeted 
by modeling carried interest reform on the At-Risk Rules. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 465(a)(1), 542(a)(2) 
(2006). 
 79. There might be some incidental spillover impacts on non-carried interest partners due to 
economic reallocations, but such changes might be inevitable. By focusing on partner-level 
recharacterization rather than partnership-level recharacterization, my proposal limits the impact of the 
carried interest reform legislation to economic reallocations and spillover effects rather than 
encompassing tax adjustments as well. 
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Third, carried interest reform should ensure that investors are not 
entitled to a deduction at ordinary income rates for carried interest earned 
by fund managers.
80
 Providing for recharacterization at the partner level, 
rather than at the partnership level, will ensure that no such deduction is 
allowable.
81
 
Fourth, as a practical matter, carried interest recharacterization should 
be limited to investment services partnerships, which exclude partnerships 
that meet certain statutory safe harbors. In theory, investment services 
partnerships should not include partnerships engaged in active trades or 
businesses (other than management of investments) and should also 
exclude partnerships that meet an asset test (i.e., at least a certain 
(determinable) percentage of their assets are non-investment assets). Care 
should be taken to ensure that expansions of existing businesses and stock 
of certain qualified subsidiaries (which should be carefully defined) are 
excluded from recharacterization, while stock of portfolio companies is 
subject to carried interest recharacterization. 
Fifth, carried interest taxation legislation should affirmatively and 
succinctly address international tax consequences. Legislation should 
explicitly state that carried interest income retains its underlying character 
for purposes of Subpart F,
82
 and particularly, the Foreign Personal Holding 
Company Income (FPHCI) regime.
83
 Although nothing explicitly indicates 
that this would not be the case, explicitly indicating the appropriate tax 
treatment will forestall potential challenges associated with management 
of funds by means of foreign corporations. Affirmatively addressing 
international tax consequences will also ensure that carried interest income 
is generally treated as passive income for Passive Foreign Investment 
Company (PFIC) purposes.
84
 Additionally, carried interest tax legislation 
 
 
 80. This is a source of concern because without such an adjustment most carried interest reform 
could be tax neutral with respect to taxable investors and would only be revenue positive with respect 
to tax-exempt investors (who would not benefit from a deduction). See, e.g., Jones, supra note 1, at 
680 n.15 (citation omitted); Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 732; supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 Generally speaking, if carried interest is merely allocated from income then it does not provide an 
actual tax deduction, but rather, it provides a reduction in income resulting in reduced revenue via an 
opportunity cost. While some proposals would avoid permitting investors a deduction for carried 
interest earned by fund managers, see, e.g., Rosenzweig, supra note 1, others might not, and providing 
for a recharacterization at the partner level would certainly avoid providing the partnership with a 
deduction for carried interest earned. 
 81. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 82. I.R.C. §§ 951–65 (2006). 
 83. I.R.C. § 954(c). 
 84. I.R.C. §§ 1291–98 (2006). I.R.C. § 1297(b)(1) provides that passive income for PFIC 
purposes generally tracks the definition of I.R.C. § 954(c) (FPHCI). Generally, speaking, the PFIC tax 
regime is intended to discourage the use of foreign corporations as passive investment vehicles, and to 
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should either (a) explicitly provide that recharacterization of income for 
purposes of carried interest taxation does not affect the character of 
income for determining whether it is fixed or determinable, annual or 
periodical (FDAP) for purposes of withholding taxes, or alternatively, (b) 
expressly provide for treatment of carried interest income as Effectively 
Connected Income (ECI) (or perhaps both, such that—to the extent that 
actual investment management occurs outside the U.S.—U.S. source 
income could be subject to FDAP withholding).
85
 
The broad goals of economic neutrality and horizontal and vertical 
equity can be promoted in the carried interest context by exempting C 
corporations from the proposed carried interest taxation regime, by 
evaluating carried interest taxes (and applying recharacterization and loss 
suspensions) at the partner level, and by addressing non-investment 
partnerships and international tax considerations. By focusing carried 
interest tax legislation on partner-level recharacterization rather than 
partnership-level adjustments, economic distortion should be minimized. 
The investment fund managers’ focus should then revert to managing their 
 
 
punish taxpayers who seek to avoid the Subpart F regime. Permitting carried interest income that 
would otherwise be passive income (for PFIC purposes) to be recharacterized as non-passive income 
could enable a perverse result by enabling recipients of carried interest income to avoid PFIC taxation 
to which they would otherwise be subject. 
 85. Cf. I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881(a), 882 (2006). FDAP is shorthand for interest, dividends, rents, 
wages, or other income (but not capital gains) earned by nonresident aliens and foreign corporations 
from U.S. sources. Generally, FDAP is subject to a withholding tax of 30 percent of the gross amount 
of the income earned, but this may be reduced by tax treaties. ECI is generally exempt from 
withholding and gross-income taxation, but is subject to U.S. taxation on a net-income basis, and 
foreign corporations receiving ECI must generally file U.S. corporate federal income tax returns. In 
order to ensure that this result is feasible, Congress might need to explicitly provide a limited override 
of I.R.C. § 864(b)(2) (2006). Such an override should automatically override regulations promulgated 
under I.R.C. § 864, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2 (2010). 
 This is only a brief summary of some of the international tax consequences associated with carried 
interest tax reform. For a more thorough analysis, see Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 746–55. Professor 
Rosenzweig provides a particularly insightful analysis as to why neither funds nor their managers 
would likely expatriate (and correspondingly, why fund managers are unlikely to renounce their U.S. 
citizenship) in order to avoid higher taxes resulting from carried interest reform. In short, individuals 
are likely to value the benefits of U.S. citizenship. These benefits include the opportunity to work in 
and travel to the U.S. (people who renounce citizenship for tax purposes may be denied entry into the 
U.S., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(E) (2006)). Furthermore, funds’ activities in managing U.S. companies 
may be sufficient to establish either a U.S. trade or business (in the absence of a tax treaty) or a 
Permanent Establishment (in the presence of a tax treaty), either of which would subject them to U.S. 
taxation on their U.S. profits. See Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 746–55. Because many investors in 
funds may be tax-exempt (and therefore not subject to tax on their investments in a partnership as long 
as they avoid UBTI), a manager might have trouble convincing tax-exempt entities to invest in a fund 
which will be subject to an entity-level U.S. income tax. See id.; see also United States Model Income 
Tax Convention art. 5, Nov. 15, 2006 (defining ―Permanent Establishment‖); OECD Articles of the 
Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital ch II, art. 5, July 15, 2005 (defining 
―Permanent Establishment‖). 
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clients’ portfolios in a manner that promotes client wealth-maximization 
rather than manager tax-minimization. 
IV. TAX POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
As a general consideration, it should be noted that Congress can—and 
in certain limited instances has—provided for particular disfavored or 
punitive tax treatment for certain forms of income or income derived from 
particular conduct.
86
 However, such instances should be, and generally are, 
limited to instances in which the income or conduct targeted is considered 
particularly violative of Congressional tax policy or societal norms and 
goals.
87
 Because earning carried interest neither violates Congressional tax 
policy nor societal norms and goals, it would be inappropriate to subject 
carried interest to any punitive tax treatment. Rather, the harshest 
treatment to which it should be subject is taxation as ordinary income, 
rather than long-term capital gains. 
There is, however, an opportunity to use carried interest taxation as a 
―carrot‖ to promote broader economic policies. As discussed in Part I.A,88 
tax policy has many competing goals. Many of these goals may 
incidentally or intrinsically conflict. Tax policy, however, is only one half 
of the fiscal policy equation.
89
 The other half of the equation is the 
expenditure and, more broadly, the economic stability and growth side of 
 
 
 86. Congress has done this by means of denying deductions, denying credits, or subjecting 
income to specific additional taxes. For an example of denial of deductions, see I.R.C. § 162(c) (2006) 
(denying deductions on bribes and kickbacks); I.R.C. § 162(f) (2006) (denying deductions on fines and 
penalties); I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006) (limiting deduction for salary paid to certain highly compensated 
employees of publicly traded corporations and denying deductions for salaries in excess of 
$1,000,000); and I.R.C. § 280E (2006) (denying any deductions from gross income for expenses paid 
in connection with trades or businesses associated with illegal drugs). For an example of denial of 
credits, see I.R.C. § 908 (2006) (reducing foreign tax credits relating to participation in, or cooperation 
with, certain unsanctioned international boycotts). For an example of imposition of additional taxes, 
see I.R.C. § 531 (2006) (Accumulated Earnings Tax); and I.R.C. § 5881 (2006) (excise tax on 
greenmail). 
 87. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. The only provision amongst those discussed that 
does not address an explicitly perceived societal ill is the tax on improper accumulation of earnings. 
Much of the reasoning in support of this tax is that it is intended to discourage taxpayers from avoiding 
income taxes at the shareholder level by failure to pay dividends. In effect, the additional tax is in 
place in order to discourage taxpayers from avoiding taxes that the government has imposed by means 
of timing. 
 88. See supra notes 6–28 and accompanying text. 
 89. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. From a fiscal policy perspective, tax policy may 
generally be considered the revenue raising half of the equation. Tax policy considerations generally 
deal with how to raise revenue in the fairest way possible. See supra Part I.A. 
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fiscal policy.
90
 I posit that an optimal carried interest taxation regime will 
not focus only on the myopic goal of short-term revenue maximization,
91
 
but rather, will consider both the economic effects that might naturally 
result from a standardized carried interest tax rate, as well as the 
opportunity for Congress to apply a ―directed‖ tax rate to carried interest 
income in order to promote targeted nontax fiscal policy objectives. 
It is worth considering whether certain funds, or certain investments, 
should be exempt from carried interest tax reform (i.e., permitted to retain 
the usage of long-term capital gains rates). Often, funds whose managers 
earn carried interest are divided into three general groupings: hedge funds, 
private equity funds, and venture capital funds.
92
 Hedge fund managers are 
often ineligible for preferential long-term capital gains rates on carried 
interest due to the fact that many hedge funds focus on short-term trading. 
Accordingly, because hedge funds often sell much of their investments 
within one year of purchase, long-term capital gain taxation is often 
unavailable.
93
 Private equity and venture capital fund managers are often 
 
 
 90. This other half of the fiscal policy equation can generally be conceptualized as consisting of 
economic stability, price stability (i.e., low and ―acceptable‖ inflation), economic growth (i.e., 
increasing GDP), and low unemployment. 
 91. See, e.g., Jude Wanniski, Taxes, Revenues, and the “Laffer Curve”, PUB. INT., Winter 1978, 
at 3, available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20080528_197805001taxesrevenuesandthe 
laffercurvejudewanniski.pdf (the famous/infamous ―Laffer Curve,‖ which posits that increasing 
marginal tax rates always reduces economic activity and growth, and increasing marginal tax rates in 
excess of some particular rate will result in decreased tax revenues, due to a combination of willful 
noncompliance and decreases in economic activity); Arthur B. Laffer, The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, 
and Future, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDERS, June 1, 2004, available at http://www.heritage.org/ 
Research/Reports/2004/06/The-Laffer-Curve-Past-Present-and-Future#pgfId-1121173 (discussing the 
Laffer Curve and historical and recent data). There is still considerable debate amongst economists as 
to whether maximizing tax rates results in maximum tax revenues, and if not, which tax rate will 
maximize tax revenues. From a conceptual perspective, because taxes can impair economic growth 
and development, one should never apply a tax rate higher than the revenue-maximizing tax rate. In 
such an instance, one is both reducing tax revenues and retarding economic growth. However, because 
at lower tax rates there is a tradeoff between economic growth and taxes, one might (and often does) 
choose a tax rate below the tax revenue-maximizing rate. To the extent that some resources might be 
somewhat inflexible (e.g., they exhibit a degree of short-term economic inelasticity such as tax-
inelasticity), a tax policy could result in a short-term tax revenue maximization tax rate greater than the 
long-term tax revenue maximizing tax rate.  
 92. See Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 714–15. 
 93. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 1221, 1222(3), 1223 (2006) (capital gains preferences); see also 
Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 733. But cf. Jones, supra note 1, at 680–81 (noting that both private 
equity fund managers and hedge fund managers obtained favorable tax rates). However, it is worth 
noting that conceptually, hedge fund managers should not be entitled to any more favorable tax 
treatment than private equity fund managers. As such, recharacterization of hedge fund carried interest 
income as ordinary income will deny hedge fund managers the benefit of offsetting such carried 
interest income with capital losses. Additionally, if a hedge fund holds an investment for longer than 
one year, then carried interest associated with that investment may be eligible for long-term capital 
gains rates. 
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the primary beneficiaries of the current carried interest regime. However, 
conceptually, private equity funds are very different from venture capital 
funds. Venture capital funds tend to invest in early-stage companies, 
whose success is far from certain. They may invest in new ideas, concepts, 
or technologies. They also often improve the likelihood that their 
investments will succeed by helping founders network and attract 
additional talent, and sometimes providing other services. Lastly, they 
tend to only purchase an interest in a company, rather than a controlling 
stake.
94
 Private equity funds, on the other hand, tend to invest in more 
mature enterprises, often engage in larger transactions, and often seek 
controlling stakes in their investments.
95
 Accordingly, venture capital 
funds might provide significant societal benefits (―spillover benefits‖), 
whereas private equity funds might not.
96
 Therefore, it might be 
appropriate to permit venture capital funds to retain current-law carried 
interest tax preferences, while limiting the availability of such preferences 
for private equity funds. 
An objective test should be utilized to effectively distinguish venture 
capital funds from private equity funds and hedge funds. Such a test can 
establish a bright-line rule, so a fund manager can easily determine 
whether his or her carried interest should be recharacterized on his or her 
individual income tax return. 
Fortunately, various Internal Revenue Code provisions already provide 
models for objective tests which could be applied to distinguish venture 
 
 
 94. See, e.g., LINS ET AL., supra note 31, § 12:2. Lins groups venture capital funds as a subset of 
private equity funds. While most do not include venture capital funds within the private equity space, a 
strong case could be made that a venture capital fund is, in fact, a form of a private equity fund. For 
purposes of my proposal, however, this nuance is superfluous because I propose evaluating funds 
based upon their investments (and objective characteristics related thereto) rather than according to 
mere labels. See infra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
 95. See, e.g., LINS ET AL., supra note 31, § 12:1. Many private equity funds are permitted to only 
invest in controlling stakes in companies by the terms of their offering and operating documents. Id. 
 96. By enabling new technologies and ideas to reach the market, venture capital funds may 
increase the availability of technologies for consumers, or alternatively, might increase overall societal 
efficiency by helping a novel or improved technology enter the mainstream market. This is not to say 
that venture capital funds ignore profits (they do not), but rather, that their activities provide benefits to 
society as a whole. On the other hand, private equity funds are often more focused on profit. Because 
private equity funds often focus on finding opportunities for profit in more mature companies, they 
often focus more on ―cost-cutting‖ and ―right-sizing.‖ Such activities, while potentially necessary to 
earn a profit, often result in job losses and reduced product availability. In particular, such focuses can 
result in offshoring, reducing employment in the U.S. and shifting jobs to other countries. This conduct 
often results in spillover costs to society, such as the demand for public funds to pay unemployment 
compensation (increased fiscal outlays), reduced income due to job losses (and a corresponding 
reduction in income tax revenue and decreased fiscal receipts), and other structural inefficiencies due 
to the need for terminated workers to learn new skills (inefficiencies associated with the start of a new 
learning curve). See generally id. at 12:1–2. 
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capital carried interest from private equity carried interest.
97
 A proper test 
should focus on investments in individual companies, and should permit a 
fund manager to be eligible for long-term capital gains from the carried 
interest attributable to any sale or other disposition of stock of that 
individual corporation if the issuer had issued not more than a stipulated 
threshold of capital stock at the time of the venture capital fund’s 
investment—provided that the fund directly invested in the company.98 
Such a provision should not be limited solely to venture capital funds 
because it would be wasteful to distinguish between venture capital funds 
and private equity funds. Rather, by focusing on the individual investee 
corporations, Congress can ensure investments that are deemed generally 
beneficial to society are eligible for long-term capital gains rates on 
carried interest.
99
 
Additionally, as discussed in Part I,
100
 investment fund managers 
(particularly private equity fund managers) often have the opportunity to 
wield inordinate influence over vast swaths of the U.S. economy. This is 
neither a virtue nor a vice, but rather, it is the state of the world. This 
situation presents a unique opportunity. Rather than applying a 
standardized tax rate to all carried interest income, Congress should 
consider providing that carried interest income will generally be taxed as 
ordinary income. If a particular fund meets certain specific policy 
objectives, then its managers might be permitted to treat a portion of its 
 
 
 97. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1202(d) (2006) (providing for certain modified capital gains preferences 
and limiting such preferences to C corporations with not more than $50,000,000 in gross assets); 
I.R.C. § 1244(c)(3) (2006) (providing for limited ordinary loss treatment with respect to certain 
corporate stock and limiting such treatment to the first $1,000,000 of stock issued). 
 98. The actual threshold could be determined by statute or Treasury regulation, but it should be 
based on the total amount of capital stock typically issued by a small company that receives venture 
capital financing immediately after it has completed its final round of venture capital financing. 
 Congress may also decide to impose additional requirements in its test. For example, it might 
require that gross receipts of the issuer have never exceeded a certain threshold or that the issuer 
corporation not have been in existence for more than a threshold time period. If such additional tests 
are imposed, anti-abuse provisions might be advisable in order to ensure that only certain investments 
can enable fund managers to obtain long-term capital gains rates on carried interest income. However, 
Congress should, at a minimum, impose the capital stock test because the test may be less subject to 
abuse (and Congress should consider whether additional requirements are advisable). 
 99. It is worth noting that some investments made by a venture capital fund might be ineligible 
for preferential rates under this provision, and alternatively, that some investments by private equity 
funds or hedge funds might qualify. This should not be a concern because the focus of this provision 
should be to promote investments that are likely to produce societal benefits. In addition, because 
venture-stage companies are often riskier investments than mature companies, tax subsidies in the 
form of preferential rates may be appropriate in order to encourage investment by increasing the 
mathematical expected after-tax return. 
 100. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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carried interest income as being exempt from recharacterization.
101
 This 
can enable Congress to honestly (for once) say it is not merely providing a 
favored constituency with a coveted tax break, but rather, that the 
constituency has, in fact, earned that tax break in exchange for providing a 
far greater benefit to the public. Exactly which policy objectives should be 
entitled to such a break is a matter for Congress to decide, but 
hypothetically, one example might be increasing, by a certain percentage, 
the headcount of (legal) U.S. workers earning 300 percent of the poverty 
income rate at investment companies (perhaps as reported in the form of 
W-2 wages).
102
 In order to ensure that policy goals are the focus, Congress 
should generally enact broad guidelines, and Treasury should draft 
regulations to implement the broad Congressional mandate. Some of the 
Treasury guidance should specifically quantify what qualifies as meeting 
Congressional mandates.
103
 Especially with respect to funds that can 
exercise control of portfolio companies, fund managers may be able to 
significantly aid Congress in achieving broad national goals. All it might 
take is a small nudge, and the ―carrot‖ of non-recharacterization of carried 
interest income might be sufficient. 
Taken as a whole, my proposed legislation would generally provide for 
partner-level recharacterization of carried interest income as ordinary 
income, but only for individual (or non-C corporation) partners who are 
partners in investment services partnerships. However, my proposal would 
also permit carried interest derived from venture-capital-type investments 
and from certain limited private-equity-type investments to avoid 
recharacterization. I would also recommend enacting the SECA/FICA 
reform embodied in the provisions related to Proposed I.R.C. § 710.
104
 
Lastly, my proposal focuses on supporting broader fiscal policies, as 
opposed to merely tax policies. Accordingly, the portion of my proposal 
which generally provides for ordinary income tax treatment for carried 
interest (my ―general proposal‖) promotes horizontal equity, vertical 
equity, and economic neutrality. My general proposal promotes horizontal 
equity by taxing investment fund managers at the same rates as other 
 
 
 101. That is to say, as retaining its original character. 
 102. Most of the focus of this proposed Internal Revenue Code provision will be targeted towards 
private equity funds. A fund should have a minimum ownership in each portfolio company that should 
be sufficient to enable it to exercise a degree of influence, if not outright control. 
 103. An example of some guidance might be minimum percentage increases, as well as baseline 
periods for measuring headcount in order to determine the amount by which headcount increased. 
 104. H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. §§ 412(d), 413 (as engrossed by House, May 28, 2010). 
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service providers.
105
 My general proposal promotes vertical equity because 
it eliminates a regressive element of the tax code, thereby promoting a 
trend towards progressivity (and a direct push towards a more 
proportionate system). My general proposal promotes economic neutrality 
because it eliminates an incentive to establish one type of investment 
vehicle (LLC/LP investment fund with carried interest) over others.
106
 My 
general proposal does not promote administrability compared to the status 
quo, but based upon the information reporting requirements, it should be 
reasonably administrable. Lastly, my general proposal also does not 
promote compliance compared to the status quo, but it should promote 
compliance when coupled with the information reporting requirements. 
My targeted proposal (which provides for retention of current tax 
treatment for specific investments), however, provides specific economic 
incentives to fund managers who either invest in venture capital-type 
investments, or who actively promote specific Congressional fiscal policy 
objectives. In doing so, it slightly contributes to horizontal inequity (by 
treating some similarly situated taxpayers slightly differently) and vertical 
inequity (by providing lower income tax rates to some wealthy and high-
income individuals), and it also contravenes economic neutrality (due to 
the incentivization) when compared to the status quo (but not when 
compared to my general proposal). My targeted proposal is also slightly 
more difficult to administer, and it might provide a small incentive 
towards non-compliance due to the opportunity for lower tax rates (and the 
fact that some might seek to obtain the benefits of those incentive rates 
without meeting the requirements to be entitled to such rates). However, 
my targeted proposal also promotes economic growth, economic stability, 
and increased employment. Because my general proposal applies to those 
who do not meet the requirements for my targeted proposal, I believe that 
my comprehensive proposal (both general and targeted components) 
should generally promote tax policy goals (for most fund managers, by 
application of my general proposal), and that it balances general fiscal 
 
 
 105. But see Postlewaite, supra note 1, at 767–68. I disagree with Professor Postlewaite’s analysis 
regarding optimal taxation of carried interest (Professor Postlewaite appears to generally favor the 
status quo) because the other forms of equity he evaluates (grant of corporate stock and grant of 
partnership capital interest) have both been subject to tax as ordinary income prior to being entitled to 
long-term capital gains rates. By way of contrast, the grant of a partnership profits interest is not 
subject to taxation upon receipt. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Therefore the recipient of 
such an interest is not similarly situated to a person who is subject to tax upon receipt of an equity 
interest. 
 106. More notably, it eliminates a theoretical, artificial incentive to pursue a career as a fund 
manager over a different professional career. 
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policy considerations in promoting critical fiscal policy goals at the 
expense of certain tax policy goals (with respect to certain taxpayers who 
act as stewards to promote those fiscal policy goals, by application of my 
targeted proposal). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Carried interest taxation is a very dynamic area of evolving tax policy. 
Although carried interest taxation is rapidly changing, it is important to 
remember that, while carried interest should generally be taxed as 
compensation income, it might be appropriate to provide fund managers 
with preferred tax rates to the extent that such an incentive can assist 
Congress in achieving broader policy objectives. 
Congress must also be aware of the significant pitfalls attendant to any 
proposed changes to carried interest taxation. As soon as Congress enacts 
carried interest reform, fund managers will seek advice as to how to 
minimize the tax impact of the legislation, and practitioners will begin the 
process of planning to minimize its impact on their clients.
107
 Therefore, as 
a practical matter, it is critical that the carried interest reform ultimately 
enacted be both robust enough to prevent abuse and focused enough to 
avoid causing collateral damage (by affecting too many taxpayers or 
taxpayers other than those Congress intended). Proposed I.R.C. § 710, as it 
currently stands, is far too broad because it will adversely impact 
corporations engaged in general trades or businesses (businesses other 
than investment management), and it may also reduce the number of 
investment options available to sophisticated investors. At the same time, 
although Proposed I.R.C. § 710 might impose an increased tax burden on 
carried interests in existing funds, new funds will likely be able to plan 
around it, either through new compensation structures which do not 
constitute investment services partnership interests, or through other 
planning techniques. 
My carried interest tax reform proposal promotes both tax policy and 
broader fiscal policy by balancing the interests of a conceptually ideal tax 
framework against fiscal pragmatism; however, to the extent that there is a 
tension between the two, my proposal promotes broader fiscal policy at 
the expense of general tax policy principles. The most efficient method of 
reforming carried interest taxation is by means of partner-level 
recharacterization, because this avoids any collateral tax impact on other 
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partners in the partnership. However, because some fund managers invest 
in companies that are very risky but provide significant spillover benefits 
to the economy, and others are in a position to more directly improve the 
U.S. economy by means of improving employment and wages, 
pragmatism suggests that extending the opportunity for such fund 
managers to be subject to preferential capital gains rates on their carried 
interest income will promote broader fiscal goals. My proposal is therefore 
an appropriate compromise in the context of carried interest taxation 
reform. 
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